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I. BACKGROUND

Defendants BB AB, BB Holding, and Lillemor are Swedish corporations. FAC ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 34. BB Holding dissolved and merged with Lillemor. Decl. of Josefin Kleremo ISO Mot. ("Kleremo Decl."), ¶ 3, ECF No. 37-1. BB AB and Lillemor maintain their principal places of business in Solna, Sweden. *Id.* at ¶¶ 2, 4. Plaintiff alleges the following against the BabyBjörn Defendants. BabyBjörn Defendants created and sold a baby carrier that is the relevant product in this litigation. FAC ¶ 19. BabyBjörn maintains a website that can use a California resident's location to recommend a store that sells the baby carrier. *Id.* at ¶ 60. There are "at least six" stores "within approximately 20 miles of' Plaintiff's current residence. *Id.* Before BabyBjörn discontinued the baby carriers, customers could also buy the baby carrier directly from the website. *Id.* at 59. Various movies and television shows, many of which were filmed in California, featured the baby carrier. Decl. of Leland H. Belew ISO Opp'n ("Belew Decl.") ¶¶ 2, 3, ECF No. 39-1. Further, a California company helped market the baby carrier and ensure various television shows utilized the baby carrier. *Id.* at ¶ 1, Ex. 1, ECF No. 39-2.

According to BabyBjörn Defendants, BB AB sold baby carriers to a Cleveland, Ohio Distributor. Kleremo Decl. ¶ 10. BB AB is not licensed to do business in California and has never directly sold to any US consumers. *Id.* at ¶ 11. BB AB does not own, lease, or rent any real property in California; does not have any offices or employees in California; does not have any California bank accounts or assets; and does not pay California state taxes. *Id.* at ¶ 13.

In 2012, Plaintiff's guardian ("Guardian Natalie") "and her husband signed up for a gift registry" at a Babies "R" Us store in Torrance, California and added a baby carrier to the registry. FAC ¶ 20. Guardian Natalie carried Plaintiff in the baby carrier and the baby carrier "caused Plaintiff O.T. to develop hip dysplasia." *Id.* at ¶ 24. After surgeries, hospitalizations, a body cast, and other procedures, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the BabyBjörn Defendants. *Id.* at ¶¶ 24–27.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant can move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The party asserting the existence of jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. *Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH*, 354 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2003). If the court does not require an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff "need only make a prima facie showing of the jurisdictional facts." *Boschetto v. Hansing*, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and "[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor." *Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.*, 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). Depending on the nature and extent of a defendant's contacts, if any, with a forum state, the appropriate exercise of personal jurisdiction may be either general—that is, the party is subject to any claims in that forum—or specific—that is, the party is subject only to claims arising out of its forum-related activities. *See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).

To establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff must show both that the long-arm statute of the forum state confers personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, and that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal due process requirements. *Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy*, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2006). California's long-arm statute is coextensive with the scope of what is permitted by due process. *Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd.*, 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10). Constitutional due process requires that jurisdiction be exercised over a nonresident party only if that party has "minimum contacts" with the forum, such that the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." *Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted); *accord Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 464 (1985).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiff concedes that the Court does not have general jurisdiction over BabyBjörn Defendants, Opp'n 2 n.2, and instead alleges the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over them. The Ninth Circuit employs a three-prong test for specific personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted). "If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the defendant of due process of law." Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1155 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test. Id. The first prong may be satisfied with facts sufficient to show either "purposeful availment or purposeful direction, which, though often clustered together under a shared umbrella, 'are, in fact, two distinct concepts." Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1155).

Courts in the Ninth Circuit "generally apply the purposeful availment test when the underlying claims arise from a contract, and the purposeful direction test when they arise from alleged tortious conduct." *Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp.*, 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts also apply the purposeful availment test to products liability cases. *Macias v. LG Chem*, No. SA CV 20-02416-DOC-(ADSx), 2021 WL 2953162, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2021) ("Because plaintiff's action is based upon strict products liability, negligent products liability, and negligence . . . this Court applies the purposeful availment framework.") (internal quotation marks omitted);

accord Nolte v. CEC Ent. Inc., No. CV 19-2463 PA (JPRX), 2019 WL 6972685, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2019).

The Parties apply the purposeful availment test. Mot. 11–14; Opp'n 4–16. "[T]he 'purposeful availment' requirement is satisfied if the defendant has taken deliberate action within the forum state or if he has created continuing obligations to forum residents." *Ballard v. Savage*, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). Evaluating purposeful availment "requires a qualitative evaluation of the defendant's contact with the forum state." *Harris Rutsky & Co.*, 328 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff relies in part on the following as evidence of purposeful availment: BabyBjörn Defendants advertised the baby carrier in California; BabyBjörn Defendants hired a marketing firm to help place the baby carrier in movies and television shows; and BabyBjörn Defendants maintain a website customers can use to order the baby carrier or locate a California retail store that sells the baby carrier. Opp'n 8–15.

1. <u>Personal Jurisdiction Over Lillemor and BabyBjörn Holding AB</u>

As an initial matter, the Court addresses whether it has jurisdiction over all three BabyBjörn Defendants. Mot. 16 (arguing that BB Holding did not exist during the time of the incident and has now merged with Lillemor and Lillemor is a "holding company that has no involvement in BB AB's daily operations"); Reply 4, 11 ("Plaintiff's opposition [] fails to specify which" entity "she is referring to in any given argument"); but see Opp'n 1 n.1. Plaintiff alleges the following about the three defendants. The BabyBjörn Defendants are alter egos of each other and exert control over each other. FAC ¶ 9. Each defendant "expressly or impliedly agreed to work with and assist each other" with all aspects of creating and selling the baby carrier. *Id.* at ¶ 10. Each defendant aided in breaching the duty to Plaintiff and knew of the breach. *Id.* at ¶ 12. Each defendant was either "engaged in . . . or [] a successor in interest to" entities involved in creating, marketing, and selling the baby carrier. *Id.* at ¶ 14.

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The BabyBjörn Defendants disagree. The BabyBjörn Defendants argue that Lillemor "has no involvement in the daily business activities of BB AB." Kleremo Decl. ¶ 7. They also state that BB Holding was first registered on March 26, 2018 and dissolved on June 29, 2020. *Id.* at ¶ 3. According to the BabyBjörn Defendants, "the only operative entity is BB AB." *Id.* at ¶ 6.

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over all three BabyBjörn Defendants. Plaintiff's FAC only contains conclusory allegations about the relationship between the Parties. To the extent Plaintiff intends to argue the entities are alter egos of each other, Plaintiff has to allege sufficient facts. *Sarafian v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.*, No. 2:15-cv-09397-CAS(KSx), 2016 WL 1305087, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2016) ("conclusory statements" about alter ego status are insufficient). The Court **DISMISSES** Lillemor and BB Holding.¹

2. Personal Jurisdiction Over BB AB

a. Purposeful Availment

The Court next addresses whether it has personal jurisdiction over BB AB. Plaintiff relies on a "stream of commerce plus' theory identified in *Asahi Metal Indus*. *Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano Cnty.*, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)." *Macias*, 2021 WL 2953162, at *3; Opp'n 4–7. The *Asahi Metal Indus*. *Co.* Court stated that while "[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State," it is possible that "[a]dditional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State." *Asahi Metal Indus*. *Co.*,

¹ It is unclear if Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery on this issue. Plaintiff requests jurisdictional discovery "to determine the precise scope of Defendants' contacts with California." *See* Opp'n 12 n.6. Plaintiff's grouping of all three defendants together makes it difficult to determine whether Plaintiff seeks discovery on the extent of each defendant's contact with California or whether Plaintiff seeks discovery on issues such as the amount of retail stores selling the baby carrier and the volume of sales. Given the lack of clarity, the Court **DENIES** Plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery.

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480 U.S. at 112. "Additional conduct" includes "designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State." *Id*.

Here, BB AB maintained a website that allowed potential California customers to either purchase the baby carrier from the website or identify California stores that sold the baby carrier. Belew Decl. ¶¶ 4, 11, 12, 13, Exs. 3, 12, 13, ECF Nos. 39-4, 39-12, 39-13, 39-14; see Advanced Skin & Hair, Inc. v. Bancroft, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that a defendant "purposefully availed herself of the benefits of doing business in California" by selling the products in dispute to California customers through a "commercial website"). BB AB worked with a California marketing agency to promote its baby carriers through product placements. Belew Decl. ¶ 2, Ex. 1, ECF No. 39-2. Various movies and television shows made in California featured the baby carriers. Belew Decl. ¶ 2. Guardian Natalie recalls seeing advertisements for the baby carriers at a California Babies "R" Us store. Decl. of Natalie Del Real-Trujillo ISO Opp'n ("Del Real-Trujillo Decl.") ¶ 4, ECF No. 39-19; see Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112 ("advertising in the forum State" can be considered "[a]dditional conduct [that] may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State"). BB AB disputes Plaintiff's statements, but at this stage, all conflicts in the Parties' affidavits must be construed in Plaintiff's favor. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800 ("Conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.").

In light of all of these facts, BB AB has purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in California. *Macias*, 2021 WL 2953162, at *3 ("Whether the 'additional conduct' alleged is sufficient to constitute purposeful availment is a case-by-case analysis particular to each Defendant").²

² The Court declines to address Plaintiff's other arguments as they are unnecessary for

b. Arising Under Defendant's Contacts With the Forum

In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, "the *suit*' must 'aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the *forum*." *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.* v. *Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty.*, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 571 U.S. 117, 118, (2014)) (alterations in original).³

Plaintiff has satisfied this prong. After viewing advertisements in California, *see* Del Real-Trujillo Decl. ¶ 3, Guardian Natalie added the baby carrier to her Babies "R" Us gift registry in California and a California friend of family member purchased the baby carrier for her. FAC ¶¶ 20, 21. Plaintiff now brings claims related to the use of this baby carrier. *Id.* at ¶¶ 66–107. Plaintiff has established that her claims arise under BB AB's contacts with the forum.

c. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

Because Plaintiff has made a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, the Court now considers whether exercising personal jurisdiction over BB AB comports with "fair play and substantial justice." *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted). "The Supreme Court has expounded several factors for a district court to consider: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state's interests, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the several states' shared interest in

this analysis.

Though the Ninth Circuit has traditionally used a "but for" test whereby a plaintiff has to show that "he would not have suffered an injury 'but for' [the defendant's] forum-related conduct," *Menken v. Emm*, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007), the Supreme Court appears to have called this test into question. *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1033, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021) (Alito, J. concurring) ("Ford, however, asks us to adopt an unprecedented rule under which a defendant's contacts with the forum State must be proven to have been a butfor cause of the tort plaintiff 's injury. The Court properly rejects that argument."); *see also Clarke v. Dutton Harris & Co., PLLC*, No. 2:20-cv-00160-JAD-BNW, 2021 WL 1225881, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2021) (stating *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist.* "appears to have recently done away" with the Ninth Circuit's approach).

furthering fundamental substantive social policies." *LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. Macey Bankr. L., P.C.*, No. 2:13-cv-8620-ODW (MRWx), 2014 WL 808854, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (citing *World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen,* 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). BB AB carries the burden of making "a 'compelling case' that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable." *Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc.*, 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Burger King Corp.*, 471 U.S. at 476–78). The Court "does not lightly consider exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corporation." *Falco v. Nissan N. Am. Inc.*, 96 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1060–61 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015).

Here, "there is a strong interest in adjudicating the claims in California" because Plaintiff resides in California. FAC ¶ 4; *Purely Pomegranate, Inc. v. Fallon Trading Co.*, No. SACV 15-0840-DOC (JCGx), 2015 WL 13283452, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015). Plaintiff asserts California law claims against BB AB. FAC ¶¶ 66–107. BB AB merely provides largely conclusory allegations that do not lay out "a 'compelling case'" that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. *Mavrix Photo, Inc.*, 647 F.3d at 1228 (quoting *Burger King Corp.*, 471 U.S. at 476–78). The Court finds that exercising personal jurisdiction over BB AB comports with "fair play and substantial justice." *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint that has been dismissed should be freely granted unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); *Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the First Amended Complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court **GRANTS** in part and **DENIES** in part BabyBjörn Defendants' Motion. The Court dismisses Lillemor and BabyBjörn Holding AB without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint no later than 14 days from the date of this Order, if it can do so consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and this

Case 2:20-cv-04517-MCS-KS Document 42 Filed 09/08/21 Page 10 of 10 Page ID #:452